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insist on extensive judicial review.s It is ironic that this, the fourth of the major
thrusts of attack outlined above, is most likely to effect a change in the present
practice. Critics of the practice would prefer to defeat it by exposing its baselessness or its outrageousness. No constitutional authority to regulate morals
exists; no statutory authority to remove matter from the mail can be found; no
restriction upon freedom of speech is tolerable. These arguments, abstractly
persuasive, yield to the reality of history and precedent. Congress does in fact
have power to decide-within limits-what matter will be carried in the mail.
Section 1461 has authorized removal of obscene matter from the mail. Matter
which is indeed obscene is not protected from congressional proscription by the
first amendment. Only the procedure for determining obscenity may be successfully attacked; expansion of judicial review will relieve most of the pressure
there. What probably will survive is censorship of an ill-definable collection of
matter by the federal letter-carrying agency under the watchful eye of federal
courts.
83 It is possible that judicial insistence upon extensive review will lead to relocation of the
initial decision. If the majority of senders of matter found nonmailable appeal the administrative determination, the Post Office hearing will become meaningless. The relocation may take
any of the forms suggested above.

STRIKE SUPERSENIORITY: VALID EXTENSION OF NLRB v.
MACKAY RADIO AND TELEGRAPH OR VIOLATION OF
SECTION 8(a)(3) OF THE NLRA?
In NLRB. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,' the Supreme Court ruled that
an employer had the right permanently to replace economic strikers.2 Although
the Court recognized that its ruling would indirectly inhibit employees in the
exercise of their right to strike,3 the Court gave paramount weight to the right
of the employer "to protect and continue his business by supplying places left
1304 U.S. 333 (1938).

2The Mackay decision and other cases dealing with the reinstatement or discharge of strikers under the NLRA distinguish between current labor dispute strikes (often called economic
strikes) and strikes brought about by an employer's unfair labor practice. The distinction
originates in the wording of section 2(3) of the Act. The Mackay doctrine is limited to economic
strikes. In the case of an unfair labor practice strike, the strikers are entitled to reinstatement
notwithstanding the hiring of replacements during the strike, and their reinstatement must be
unconditional, as though they had not been absent from work. NLRB v. Mackay Radio and
Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 344-45 (1938); NLRB v. Sartorius & Co., 140 F.2d 203, 206 (2d
Cir. 1944); Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 136 F.2d 175, 181 (7th Cir. 1943); Republic
Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 820, 821 (3d Cir. 1940).
3Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat.
140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958), accords employees general but not unqualified protection to
"engage in ... concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection"; while section 2(3), 49 Stat. 450 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 152(3) (1958), preserves to strikers their protected status as employees under the Act.
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vacant by strikers. ' 4 In concluding that the employer was not bound to discharge replacements upon the termination of the strike the Court appeared to
accept the position that the employer's right to maintain operations during a
strike was given substance by his privilege to give replacements permanent
tenure.
In the usual strike situation, a number of practical considerations may deter
the employer from exercising his right to replace strikers. Among these are the
unavailability of a sufficient number of skilled replacements, and the bitterness, and possibly violence, which may be touched off by replacement. One
additional difficulty that has been asserted by employers is the reluctance of
replacements to accept employment during the strike on terms which will, under
the normal operation of the employer's seniority system, make the replacements
the most vulnerable to lay-off in the event of any seasonal or other curtailment
of the employer's work force following the strike.
To meet the latter difficulty, employers have devised so-called superseniority
or strike seniority arrangements, and have urged that such arrangements are a
legitimate means of preventing normal seniority from eroding the employer's
right to replace. Under the typical superseniority plan, the employer adopts
a new seniority list which reduces the seniority standing of strikers to below that
of non-strikers and of new replacements hired during the strike. The crucial
element in such an arrangement is that it makes reinstated strikers the most
vulnerable to displacement in the event of a subsequent lay-off.
The National Labor Relations Board has invalidated all the superseniority
plans on which it has ruled.5 In the later cases the Board appears, however, to
have qualified its earlier position that superseniority arrangements were invalid
per se. The Board's two most recent rulings have stressed the improper motive
4 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938). "Nor was it an unfair labor practice to replace the striking employees with others in an effort to carry on the business. Although section 13 of the act, 29
U.S.C.A. § 163, provides, 'Nothing in this Act [chapter] shall be construed so as to interfere
with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike,' it does not follow that an employer
guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has lost the right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left vacant by strikers. And he is not bound to discharge those hired
to fill the places of the strikers, upon the election of the latter to resume their employment, in
order to create places for them. The assurance by respondent to those who accepted employment during the strike that if they so desired their places might be permanent was not an unfair labor practice, nor was it such to reinstate only so many of the strikers as there were vacant
places to be filled." Id. at 345-46.
The Court in Mackay did not expressly state whether a valid offer of permanent tenure to
replacements is limited to the situation where it is in fact necessary to induce otherwise unwilling workers to accept the positions vacated by the strikers. Neither did it make clear at what
stage of the strike the employer's assurance of permanent tenure to those replacements who
accepted employment must be made in order to bring it within the Mackay rule. But see notes
21 and 29 infra.

6 California Date Growers Assn., 118 N.L.R.B. 246 (1957); Mathieson Chemical Corp., 114
N.L.R.B. 486 (1955); Potlatch Forests, Inc., 87 N.L.R.B. 1193 (1949); St. Mary's Sewer Pipe
Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 1226 (1944); Indiana Desk Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 76 (1944); Precision Castings
Co., 48 N.L.R.B. 870 (1943); Paper, Caimenson and Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 553 (1940).
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behind the plan, rather than its inherently discriminatory character. The
Courts of Appeals have, on the other hand, from the outset, shown a more favorable disposition toward superseniority plans, but they have, in the three cases in
which they have ruled upon superseniority, 7 differed on the requirements for a
valid plan. The inconsistent judicial treatment may in part be accounted for by
different interpretations of the Mackay doctrine, upon which all three decisions
claim to be based.
This comment will first examine the decisions on superseniority in the light
of the Mackay doctrine. It will then consider the desirability of this extension of
the Mackay rule in the light of the statutory framework and its underlying

policy.
I
In NLRB v. Potlatch Forests, the first case presenting the issue to the
courts, the Mackay doctrine was extended to sanction the initiation and implementation of a strike superseniority plan. 9 During a strike for higher wages, the
employer was able to resume operations with some new employees and a large
number of former strikers who had abandoned the strike.10 After the strike, the
company reinstated the remaining strikers but altered its former seniority plan
by instituting a strike superseniority policy. In the Board proceedings the employer claimed to have advocated superseniority in the course of the strike settlement negotiations, but the Board found that the new policy was in fact formulated shortly after the strike settlement agreement had been signed.1 More than
a year later, the employer invoked this policy to justify the lay-off of two former
strikers. The NLRB held 2 that the superseniority policy was a violation of the
8

6California Date Growers Assn., supra note 5; Mathieson Chemical Corp., supra note 5.
7
NLRB v. California Date Growers Assn., 259 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1958); Olin Mathieson
Chemical Corp. v. NLRB, 232 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1956), a 'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 1020 (1957);
NLRB v. Potlatch Forests, 189 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1951).
9For a statement of the disputed seniority plan in the .Potlatchcase, as embodied in the employer's "Return-to-Work Policy," see Potlatch Forests, Inc., 87 N.L.R.B. 1193, 1200-01
(1949).
10The court referred to the members of this group as "replacements" regardless of whether
they were new workers or former strikers who crossed the picket lines. At the termination of
the strike, the "replacements" numbered about 1750 out of a total normal working force of
about 2600. NLRB v. Potlatch Forests, supra note 7, at 83.
1, Portlatch Forests, Inc., supra note 9, at 1199-1200. See also note 24 infra.
"2Potlatch Forests, Inc., 87 N.L.R.B. 1193 (1949). In a prior case, General Electric Co., 80
N.L.tRB. 510, 513 (1948), the Board, in holding that the "tolling" of seniority rights of strikers
during the period of a strike was an unfair labor practice, had said, "except to the extent that a
striker may be replaced during an economic strike, his employment relationship cannot otherwise be severed or impaired because of his strike activity." The Board's holding in Potlatch was
similarly in accord with its prior decisions on superseniority in the cases cited in note 5 supra.
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anti-discriminatory provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. 13 The
Board's petition for enforcement was, however, denied by the 9th Circuit Court
of Appeals, which held that, in the absence of evidence of a discriminatory motive, superseniority is a necessary concomitant of the right to hire replacements
14
recognized in Mackay.
A different result from that in Potlatchwas reached by the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit in Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v.NLRB. 15 The employer in that case instituted a superseniority plan shortly after the termination
of an economic strike. Subsequently, seven employees were laid off in accordance
with the new policy. The Board's holding that the policy violated sections
8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act 16 was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit,lr one judge dissenting. 8

The employer in Olin Mathieson relied upon two contentions: first, that since
Mackay permits the hiring of permanent replacements it also permits the less
drastic action of depriving strikers of seniority for lay-off purposes; second, the
employer contended that his conduct was specifically sanctioned by the 9th
19
Circuit decision in Potlatch.
The Court of Appeals brushed aside the first contention, stating that "The
Mackay decision merely holds that an employer need not displace employees
13"Sec. 8(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(l) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7; [see note 3
supra]... (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization...
49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) and (3) (1958).
14 "In the instant case, therefore, the 'discrimination' between replacements and strikers is
not an unfair labor practice despite a tendency to discourage union activities, because the
benefit conferred upon the replacements is a benefit reasonably appropriate for the employer
to confer in attempting 'to protect and continue his business by supplying places left vacant by
strikers.' " 189 F.2d 82, 86 (1951).
35
232 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1956), a.ff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 1020 (1957).
16
Mathieson Chemical Corp., 114 N.L.R.B. 486 (1955). The Board referred briefly, in a
footnote, to the 4th Circuit decision in Pollaick,stating that that case was distinguishable upon
the facts from the case before the Board. However, Acting Chairman Rogers and Member
Murdock were "constrained, with due deference to that court, to disagree with the [court's]
decision [in Potlatch] to the extent that it may conflict with the present finding." 114 N.L.R.B.
486, 488, n.2. For a comparison of the relevant facts in the two cases see note 24 infra.
17 In addition to a violation of 8(a)(3), the court found that "Olin's superseniority policy is
in conflict with section 13 [49 Stat. 457 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1958)] of the Act, providing
that 'nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as
either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike .... '" 232 F.2d
158, 160 (4th Cir. 1956). Incidental to the holding on the employer's strike seniority policy, the
NLRB and the Court of Appeals found that the employer had refused to bargain collectively
as required by section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the NLRA. Id. at 162.
18Ibid. Circuit Judge Soper dissented on the ground that the majority opinion was "in direct
conflict with that of the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. Potlatch Forests, 189 F.2d 82, which is
not distinguishable in any essential feature....
19232 F.2d 158, 160 (1956).
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hired during an economic strike to make room for returning strikers," 2 and
stressing that in cntrast to Mackay, in Olin Matkieson the employer had promulgated his new policy after the strike, when it was no longer a necessary inducement to the workers to keep his plant in operation.21 The court then distinguished Polatck principally on the ground that the employer in Potlatch had
advocated strike seniority before the strike was settled, had adopted the policy
at the time of settlement, and had consistently maintained that policy at all
times thereafter2 Although the court based the distinction on a statement of
the court in Pollatch,"3 the underlying facts do not appear to support a significant distinction between the two cases on the basis of the timing of the new
policy. In neither case was the superseniority policy promulgated at a time
when it could possibly have been used to induce replacements to fill the vacancies.2 4 The 4th Circuit court also observed that in Olin Mathieson the "replacements" were all old employees, while in Potlatch, the "replacements" had in.
cluded both new and old employees,2s but it is unclear what influence, if any,
28
this fact had on the Olin Mathieson decision.
20 Ibid.

citing the Mackay dictum quoted in note 4 supra, the Court of Appeals went on to
say, "But the situation before us is quite different. The strike was over, the strikers had returned to work.... No promise, when they were employed, was made to the employees who
remained at work during the strike or who returned to work before the end of the strike, that
their employment would be permanent. Olin, after the strike, when there was no necessity for
such action to keep its plant in operation, promulgated its superseniority policy in favor of the
so-called 'loyal employees' and against those who returned to work after the strike had failed
and was over. Olin was dearly penalizing the strikers for exercising their right to strike and was
thereby clearly discouraging any exercise of this right in the future." Id. at 161. (Emphasis
added.)
22 hid.
23 189 F.2d at 86 (1951).
4
2 The record did not disclose what promises Potlatch had made to the replacements. Ibid.
Strike negotiations between Potlatch and the union were initiated on October 7, 1947, and on
October 12, 1947, an agreement was signed, containing the provision that "All former employees at Potlatch Forests, Inc. will return to work without discrimination." The strike was
terminated on October 13. It was not until shortly after the strike settlement agreement was
signed (apparently on October 14) that Potlatch determined upon and drafted its "Return-toWork Policy." Although it appears from the record that job protection for replacements was a
topic discussed in the negotiations, it was disputed whether lay-off seniority was specifically
touched upon, and certainly no agreement was reached on that subject. The company's new
seniority policy does not appear to have been officially brought to the union's attention until
June 1949. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 87 N.L.R.B. 1193, 1199-1201 (1949). However, the Board
did stipulate that Potlatch had maintained its new policy without deviation from October 13,
1947. 189 F.2d at 84.
In Olin Mathieson, the strike ended on March 17, 1954, and the new superseniority policy
was adopted by the employer on April 2, 1954. Thus in neither case was the test of "necessity"
enunciated by the court in Olin Mateson (see note 21 supra)met, and there would not appear
to be any material difference in the timing of the introduction of the new policies that would
justify a differing result in the two cases on the basis of this issue, since in neither case was the
strike seniority policy promulgated at a time when it could possibly have been used to induce
replacements to fill the vacancies. See also note 18 supra.
2After

21232 F.2d at 168.
26In the only subsequent reference made to this fact in the opinion, the court said, "It seems
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In enforcing the decree of the Board on the basis of the employer's discriminatory motive, the 4th Circuit did not pass on the question of whether a super
seniority plan would be valid if instituted under proper circumstances, at the
correct time, and with no improper motivation. Nevertheless, the court did
imply rather strongly that where the test of economic necessity is met, such a
plan would be proper,27 and at no point in its opinion did it criticize the result in
Potlatch. The Olin Mathieson decision did, however, squarely take issue with
Judge Orr's statement in Potlatcl28 that the timing and necessity of an offer of
permanency under the Mackay doctrine are irrelevant. The majority in the Olin
Mathieson case declared that such an offer was proper only where necessary to
29induce replacements to work during a strike.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Olin Mathieson" case and the
4th Circuit decision was unanimously affirmed from the bench after the Court
had heard only the employer's argument. 31 The Court thus cast no light on the
question whether Potlatch was a valid extension of the Mackay doctrine, and if
so whether the distinctions made by the 4th Circuit with reference to the necessity, timing, and motive of the employer's promise were acceptable ones.
The most recent decision on superseniority, NLRB v. CaliforniaDate Growers
Assn., 3 2 is of special interest since it was handed down by the 9th Circuit Court

of Appeals, which had, seven years previously, decided the Potlatchcase. 3 In the
only fair to state that the record shows no past background of hostility towards the Unions on
the part of Olin. Nor was there any discrimination between employees who did belong to the
Unions and those who did not; for all the employees involved were Union men." 232 F.2d at
162.
27 See note 21 supra.
28 "The Supreme Court... was concerned not so much with an explicit promise of permanent tenure as with the propriety of the employer's concern with that tenure." 189 F.2d at
86.
29 The Olin Mathieson court said: "With this we disagree. With a strike in progress, the primary concern of the employer is to keep his plant in operation. It is then proper for an employer, who might be unable to procure replacements save upon a promise of permanent tenure,
to promise such tenure to the replacements. But when the strike is over, when the plant is in
operation, then the imposition of the superseniority policy in favor of the replacements and
against the strikers is quite a different matter. That is the case before us." 232 F.2d at 161-62.
(Emphasis added.) It should be noted that the court here, in sanctioning the making of a
promise by the employer which meets the stipulated conditions, spoke in terms of permanent
tenure, while in the negative part of its dictum, proscribing the making of a promise under the
conditions of the case before it, the court spoke in terms of the imposition of a superseniority
policy. Thus, unless "permanent tenure" can be read as synonymous with "superseniority," or
the former can be said to necessarily include the latter (both of which are moot propositions)
this dictum raises the question whether either the timing of the policy or the nature of the
policy would in itself be sufficient to make it "quite a different matter" from the replacement of
employees in Mackay. See also note 35 infra.
30352 U.S. 819 (1956).
31352 U.S. 1020 (1957).
22259 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1958).
33Neither Orr, C.J., who had written the opinion in Potlatch, nor Fee, D.J., who was on the
Potlatch court, participated in this decision. The California Date Growers court consisted of
Bone, C.J., who wrote the opinion, Stephens, C.J., and Pope, C.J., the one member who had
also sat on the court in the Potlatch decision.
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CaliforniaDate Growers case, the employer had continued to operate during a
brief strike by using non-striking employees and replacements. Upon termination of the strike, the employer had reinstated all workers for whom work was
available, in accordance with a pre-existing seniority list. Subsequently, at the
beginning of a new season, the employer publicized and adopted a superseniority
list, and the new list was used for subsequent lay-offs of former strikers in the
employer's highly seasonal business.
The employer's general manager testified before the trial examiner that when
individual non-strikers and replacements had expressed concern over their job
security during the strike, he told them that they had become "the nucleus of
our work force" and "gave them the assurance they would be-maintained if and
when the strike was terminated." 34 The employer did not, however, advise
either the non-strikers or the strikers of the superseniority policy until three
months after the strike had terminated.
The Board, overruling the trial examiner, found that the superseniority policy was a violation of section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act. It held that the promises
made by the employer to the non-strikers and replacements could not be interpreted as extending to changes in their seniority relative to that of former
strikers, 35 and that all the employer was entitled to do "under established law"
(citing Mackay) was to refuse to reinstate any striker "permanently replaced"
by a non-striker. 3" The Board dismissed the employer's contention that his action was necessary for economic reasons and distinguished the case before it
from Potlatchon the basis of the employer's delay in announcing the new seniority policy. The Board found that the timing of the policy together with other
independent unfair labor practices38 of the employer showed that the employer
was motivated by a desire to punish the strikers.
In enforcing the Board's order, 39 the 9th Circuit court relied on Mackay and
34 California

Date Growers Assn., 118 N.L.R.B. 246, 262 (1957).
-1The distinction made by the Board between a promise of permanent tenure and a promise
of superseniority lends support to the point made in note 29 supra.
36118 N.L.R.B. at 249-50. "This is not to say, however, that the Respondent after the
strike was over could go further than that and reduce the seniority of the returning strikers,
who had not been replaced, to punish them because they had engaged in protected concerted
activity." Id. at 250.
37Id. at 248-51. The Board, on the basis of the above differentiation, found it unnecessary
to pass on the 9th Circuit's decision in Potlatck. However, Member Murdock noted his disagreement with the court's position in Potlatch,and stated that, in accordance with the Board's
decision in Potlatcli, he would rule that the employer's superseniority policy was unlawful
without regard to whether it was adopted during or after the strike. Cf. note 16 supra.
38Here, as in Olin Mathieson (see note 17 supra), the Board found that the employer had
refused to bargain collectively in violation of section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act, and went
on to say, "Such clear and unwarranted violations of the Act cannot be ignored in assessing
Respondent's motivation for an additional act of discrimination, occuring exactly at the
same time and by exactly the same means." 118 N.L.R.B. at 249.
9The order was also modified as too broad for reasons not relevant to the problem here
being discussed. 259 F.2d at 591.
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Pollatch for the proposition that "the actions taken by [the employer] in the
instant case do not constitute unfair labor practices in and of themselves. Such
40
actions in particular situations may be perfectly permissible within the act."
The court also cited Olin Mathieson and Potlatch for the proposition that "the
inotive of the employer in carrying out these actions becomes the controlling
factor." '4 It went on to stress that even some members of the employer's management had not been aware of the new policy until long after the termination
of the strike, and that nowhere on the record was it indicated that the employer
found it necessary to promise the non-strikers superseniority in order to continue its operations. The court distinguished Potlatch on the ground that in that
case the employer had made his position "clear and open before termination of
the strike." 42 It concluded that there was substantial evidence on the record to
support the Board's finding of a discriminatory and punitive motive "to discourage by this means further activity by those strikers or other employees in
' 43
behalf of the Union, all in violation of [section] 8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act."
The 9th Circuit Court in CaliforniaDateGrowers thus reaffirmed the proposition, announced in Potlatch, that superseniority, where not punitively motivated, was a logical extension of the Mackay rule and therefore not unlawful per
se. The court's dictum that "At no place in the record is it indicated that [the
employer] found it necessary to promise the non-striking employees seniority
superior to that of the strikers in order to continue its operations" 44 does, however, indicate a recognition of the "necessity" test implied in the Olin Mathieson
opinion. The CaliforniaDate Growers' court thus impliedly repudiated the notion, advanced in Potlatch, of "propriety of the employer's concern with" 4 the
status of the replacements at a later date when a promise of superseniority was
no longer necessary to insure the continuation of operations.
II
In the light of the divergent results reached and the different considerations
stressed in Olin Mattieson, and CaliforniaDate Growersas compared to Potlatch,
to what extent may Potlatchbe said to be the accepted law today? Although the
courts in both Olin Mathieson and California Date Growers distinguished Potlatch on the facts, there would appear to be little doubt that they accepted the
general proposition that superseniority when imposed under proper circumstances and without discriminatory motive, is a valid extension of the Mackay
doctrine. The 9th Circuit, in CaliforniaDate Growers, expressly reaffirmed this
aspect of the Potlatch holding.46 The 4th Circuit in Olin Mathieson strongly implied the acceptability of that position, 47 and it did not in any way criticize the
40

Id. at 589.

SIbid.
4

2Ibid. But

see text at notes 11 and 24 supra.
43'Id. at 590.

41Id. at 589.

46 See note 28 supra.
at note 40 supra.
47See note 24 supra.

46 See text
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result in Potlatch; and even the NLRB- appears to have retreated from its firm
stand in Potlatchand its predecessors against superseniority as unlawful per se.48
The merits of this extension of the Mackay doctrine will be examined below.
Since, however, the courts do not appear to be prepared to reject superseniority
as unlawful per se, it is appropriate first to examine the limitations on its application, which are suggested by the cases.
The considerations emphasized in the three opinions are: (1) "necessity"; (2)
timing of notification of strikers and non-strikers; (3) "propriety"; and (4)
motive.
It is submitted that the only criterion for the legality of superseniority plans acceptable under and consistent with the Mackay doctrine, if
indeed that doctrine can validly be extended to sanction such plans, is
the test of "necessity." The Supreme Court, in Mackay, speaking of the employer's "right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left
vacant by strikers" 49 held that this legitimate economic interest of the employer
warranted an incidental infringement of the statutory protection afforded to
strikers by the Act. The Court did not suggest that the employer might use the
grant of permanent tenure to reward replacements or to penalize strikers. Indeed, such employer action would appear to violate section 8(a)(3).
I The employer's right in Mackay to hire replacements rested solely upon his
right to carry on his business during the strike. Assurance of permanent tenure
to replacements"0 was held to be proper, despite the fact that it was in derogation of the strikers' rights, because it was in furtherance of, and reasonably necessary for, the carrying on of his business operations. Thus, to allow an employer to
use permanent tenure or superseniority as a weapon against striking employees or
to reward non-strikers would clearly be beyond the scope of the Mackay doctrine. Only where the employer can prove that promises of permanent tenure or
superseniority to replacements were reasonably necessary to induce the replacements to cross picket lines during a strike, and that such promises were made at
such a time that they would act as an inducement, should the employer be
allowed to adopt and implement a superseniority plan.
The timing of notification to non-strikersof the initiation of the superseniority
plan would appear to have no significance independent of the requirement that a
promise or offer be made at a time when it is necessary to induce replacements to
keep the employer's plant in operation during the strike.
The courts in both Olin Matkieson and CaliforniaDate Growers distinguished
48

Compare notes 12, 16 and 37 supra. In Potlacl, the Board had said, "There can be no
doubt, and it is now well settled, that a seniority policy which classifies employees according to
whether they had worked during a strike, or had not, to the detriment of the relative seniority
standings of those who had not, discriminatorily and illegally impairs the employment relationship of those who had exercised their right under the Act to engage in concerted activities."
87 N.L.R.B. at 1210 (1949).
49 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938), quoted in full note 4 supra.
so
Ibd.
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Potlatch on the ground that Potlach had' advocated superseniority prior to the
termination of the strike. 51 But in Potltch, so far as the Board's opinion indicates, the employer had made no promise to the replacements prior to the termination of the strike. The only stage at which the issue of lay-off superseniority
may have been raised prior to the strike settlement (and even this point was dis0 2
puted), was in the course of negotiations with the strikers' representatives.
It is difficult to see why the timing of the announcement of the policy to the
strikers, rather than to replacements, deserves the importance attached to it
in the three opinions.53 Both the equitable consideration that the strikers should
be notified of the terms upon which they are returning to work and the employer's statutory obligation to bargain in good faith with the strikers' representatives54 would, however, appear to call for a full disclosure of the employer's proposed policy to the strikers or their representatives before the termination of the
strike.
The "propriety" test enunciated in Potlatch would appear to rest on an untenable interpretation5 of Mackay as holding that whether or not the employer
did in fact promise permanent tenure to the replacements, he might at a later
date extend such tenure, provided that his concern with such tenure was
"proper." Although in Potlatch the new policy was stated by the court to have
been advocated before the strike was settled and adopted at the time of settlement56 the court's dictum was not limited to such a situation. Furthermore, the
court did not elaborate on what constituted "proper" concern on the part of the
employer, thereby making this an extremely tenuous and broad criterion for the
imposition of a superseniority plan. The defects inherent in this criterion, and
its rejection in Olin Mathieson and California Date Growers would appear to
justify its elimination from further consideration as a statement of either what
the law is or what it should be.
The motive of the employer in initiating a superseniority plan is an element
emphasized in all three opinions. In Potlatch,the court found no discriminatory
motive outside that inherent in superseniority. 7 In Olin Mathlieson and Califor51See text at notes 22, 42 supra.
12See note 24 supra.
53AMERicAN BAR AssociATioN, 1959 REPORT oF TH ComrTTE ON DEVELOPMENT OF TE
LAW UNDER NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 42 (1959).
54Cf. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); NLRB v. Scharfstein, 209 F.2d 261
(6th Cir. 1953).
-5 See notes 28, 29 supra.
56 Bia see note 24 supra.
67 See note 14supra. The Court did say that, "Presumably, the Board impliedly found that
the true purpose motivating Potlatch's adoption of the 'strike seniority policy' was a desire to
penalize those members of the Union who had most persistently asserted the Union's demands,"
but it went on to hold that "the conclusion that Potlatch must have realized the inevitable
consequences of the policy" was not enough to support a finding of discriminatory motive
where the employer had acted within his rights under the Mackay doctrine. NLRB v. Potlatch
Forests, 189 F.2d 82, 86 (1951).
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nia Date Growers, on the other hand, the motive of the employer was the ultimate factor upon which the courts' and the Board's decisions rested. 8
The relevance of the motivation of the employer in cases of alleged discrimination arising under the LMRA has been consistently recognized by the courts.59
Specific evidence of a discriminatory or punitive motive may serve to invalidate
a superseniority plan which fully meets the "necessity" test. But, absent a finding of improper motive, the necessity of the employer's action under the circumstances should be the controlling factor. Mere absence of specific evidence of a
discriminatory motive should not in itself be sufficient to legalize a superseniority plan. Unless the necessity test is first met, an inevitable consequence of superseniority is to punish the strikers without thereby furthering the legitimate
objective, sanctioned in Mackay, of maintaining the employer's continuity of
operations during the strike.
III

The foregoing discussion has been predicated upon an acceptance of superseniority as a valid extension of Mackay. The propriety of such an extension is,
however, itself subject to challenge as repugnant to the policy embodied in the
statute.60
A basic objective of the original Wagner Act was to insure the rights of
workers to engage in concerted activities and to endow unions with full collective bargaining powers, thereby redressing the bargaining disadvantage attributed to the individual employees.' Although the Taft-Hartley amendments
show that the interests of the employer and those of society in general were not
to be neglected,6 2 the protection of employees exercising their right to engage in
concerted activities from employer interference and discrimination is still a
dominant policy of the Act.
The Mackay doctrine was itself a limitation upon the broad protective policy
reflected in the Act, and it should, therefore, be strictly construed. In Mackay,
the Supreme Court held that an employer, in order to carry on his business during a strike, could lawfully give "assurance ... to those who accepted employment during the strike that.
their places might be permanent." 3 This meant
that the employer was "not bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of
5 See text at notes 27, 43 supra.

19NLRD v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Officers' Union of Commercial Telegraphers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
6oLaw review comment has been almost unanimously critical of such an extension of the
Mackay doctrine. See 4 STAN. L. Rv. 151 (1951); 6 RUTGERS L. REv. 470 (1952); 30 TuXAS L.
Rxv. 776 (1952); 9 WASx. & LEE L. Rlv. 115 (1952); 42 VA. L. REv. 836 (1956); 6 DuKE B.J.
143 (1957); 70 HARV. L. Rlv. 737 (1957); 52 Nw. U. L. REv. 122 (1957). For more favorable or
non-committal comment see 100 U. PA. L. Rav. 287 (1951); 41 MmNm. L. Rlv. 482 (1957).
61H.R. REP. To. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-8, 13-17 (1935).
62S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); and H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3-6 (1947).
62304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938).
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strikers, upon the election of the latter to resume their employment."' 4 But
from the proposition that replacements need not be dislodged by returning
strikers, it does not necessarily follow that replacements should acquire rights
superior to those of strikers who are reinstated. Proponents of superseniority
urge that it is less drastic than outright replacement of employees, and hence
that it is proper for an employer to take the less drastic action of depriving
strikers of seniority for lay-off purposes in order to accomplish the same objective of business continuity." This, however, not only ignores the practical consideration that the employer is seldom able to find a sufficient number of skilled
replacements to replace all the strikers, but also fails to take account of the
protection that section 2(3)M affords to the continuity of the employee's status.
Under Mackay, the employer can affect the status only of a striker who has in
fact been replaced by another worker,6 7 on the theory that the termination of the
strike strips the replaced striker of his rights as an employee under section 2(3).
Thus while the employer's right to replace under Mackay acts as a serious threat
to the limited, and usually very small, number of employees who have actually
been replaced by outsiders, the threat of a loss of seniority weighs heavily
against all strikers and, therefore, constitutes a far more potent weapon in the
hands of the employer against unions in general and more specifically against the
worker's right to strike.
It has also been suggested that the replacements have a right to demand
strike seniority "as a guaranty that the employer will not accomplish the same
result [as the firing of replacements upon the return of the strikers] by his lay-off
seniority system." 68 This argument could, however, hardly be applied to socalled replacements who are in fact old employees; and, furthermore, since the
possibility of future lay-off in the event of a curtailment of operations is a problem common to all new employees, it is highly doubtful whether replacements
should be given such greatly preferential treatment merely because they were
hired at the time of the strike. Concededly, the granting of preferential seniority
to replacements might make it easier for the employer to attract replacements to
protect his business. However, when the harm to the employees is weighed
against the protection to which the employer is entitled under the Act, the
extension of the Mackay doctrine to superseniority plans clearly appears to be
unwarranted as it tends dangerously to undermine the strike as a collective
bargaining device.6 9
64Ibid.
65See text at note 19 supra.
61Note 3 supra.
67

Home Beneficial Life Insurance Co. v. NLRB, 159 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 758 (1947); NLRB v. Poultrymen's Service Corp., 138 F.2d 204, 211 (3rd Cir. 1943);
Firth Carpet Co. v. NLRB, 129 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1942).
68 100 U. PA. L. Rlv. 287, 289 (1951).
69
Likewise, the offering of wages to replacements higher than those offered the strikers may
constitute an unfair labor practice. Cf. NLRB v. Crompton Mills, 337 U.S. 217 (1949). However, in Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1950), the 6th Circuit
Court of Appeals appears to have held that such action was permissible, at least where the
difference was not substantial. See 70 HARv.L. RPv. 737, 738 (1957).
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In addition to the policy arguments already presented against the adoption of
the Mackay rule in superseniority cases, the decisions on the subject are open to
serious question with regard to their treatment of newly hired replacements and
old employees who crossed the picket lines as one group. Only new employees
were afforded the protective cloak of "replacements" in the Mackay case. No
reasonable interpretation of the dictum in the Mackay case would appear to
justify the inclusion of "old" employees in that category, since they can hardly
be said to have "replaced" strikers and since the circumstances of necessary and
proper inducement would not appear to be present in the case of old employees
who had crossed the picket lines. 70 Furthermore, the inclusion of old employees
within the category of replacements not only sharply increases the threat to the
union and to the strikers since, as a practical matter, adequate new replacements are generally not available, but it also tends to seriously undermine the
strikers' solidarity, since the first strikers to "break ranks" and return to work7
will benefit at the expense -of their fellow-workers who remain out on strike. '
These additional factors, which tend to make superseniority a more potent
weapon against strikers in the hands of the employer, were not present in the
Mackay case, and therefore their effect on the balance of power between the
employer and the union was not considered by the Supreme Court in that case.
Thus to say that the legality of superseniority plans naturally flows from the
reasoning in the Mackay decision is a dangerous over-simplification, and, in
effect, an evasion of the necessity for a careful reappraisal of the balancing of
interests involved.
On the other hand, if superseniority were limited to new replacements, 2
thereby avoiding the thrust of the arguments just made, this would place new
employees as a group ahead both of the non-striking and the striking old employees, which would clearly be an unsatisfactory result for both the employer
and the employees. And, even if each new replacement were offered the seniority
70Indeed, the proposition that an employer may induce strikers to return to work by offering them greater seniority than full-term strikers is directly counter to holdings of the NLRB
and some of the courts of appeals that an employer violates section 8(a)(1) of the Act when he
resorts to threats or promises of benefit to coerce workers to return to work, and, also, that he
violates section 8(a)(5) when such solicitation has been conducted under circumstances and in
a manner reasonably calculated to undermine the strikers' bargaining representatives. See,
e.g., The Texas Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1360-62 (1951); American Rubber Products Corp. v.
NLRB, 214 F.2d 47, 54 (7th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. James Thompson & Co., 208 F.2d 743, 74849 (2nd Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Bradley Washfountain Co., 192 F.2d 144, 152-54 (7th Cir. 1951).
71 Here again, as in the case of outright replacement, the resulting antagonism and bad feeling aroused both between the two groups of employees and toward the employer, with their
frequent long-term effects on the cohesiveness and efficiency of the working force as a team
after the settlement of the strike, probably often act to deter the employer from attempting to
impose a superseniority plan where he might otherwise be tempted to do so. Another deterring
factor is the fact that often the strikers are more skilled and thus more valuable to the employer than the replacements.
72
For a somewhat more extended discussion of limited superseniority plans and their inherent defects see 52 Nw. U. L. REv. 122, 128-29 (1957).
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status of the employee whom he was replacing, this might again result in some
new employees receiving greater seniority than some non-striking old employees.
Similarly, any attempt to remedy this last defect by giving non-striking old employees preference over new replacements would necessarily be open to the objections already voiced73 with regard to inducing and rewarding non-striking old
employees at the expense of the strikers. Thus, in addition to the strong policy
arguments that may be made against superseniority plans, it would appear that
such plans, if critically analyzed in the light of the equities and the practical
problems involved, also pose great, if not insuperable, technical and legal problems of implementation.
The foregoing analysis suggests that strike superseniority, with its tendency
seriously to undermine the strike as a collective bargaining device, does not
qualify as a valid extension of the employer's rights under the Mackay rule.
However, given the readiness of the courts to accept strike superseniority as not
unlawful per se, and pending an authoritative ruling by the Supreme Court on
the subject, it is submitted that its application should be limited to cases where
the employer is able to show reasonable economic necessity and actual inducement of replacements as justification for the initiation of such a plan, and where
he has informed the strikers of the plan prior to the termination of the strike.
73 See

text at note 69 supra.

APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA TO
SUCCESSIVE IN PERSONAM AND IN REM ACTIONS
IN ADMIRALTY
A maritime lienor enforces his claim by a libel in rem against the vessel., If
he also has a personal claim against the owner of the vessel for the same injury,
as in cases of collision, he may proceed in personam, either at law or in admiralty.2 It is generally held that the remedies in personam and in rem are cumulative rather than in the alternative. 3
1 The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1866); The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
555 (1866). For an excellent discussion of the sources of maritime liens, emphasizing the role
of the Federal Maritime Lien Act, see GImoim & BLAcK, Anmmury §§ 9-30 to 9-43 (1954).
2 See Gi.MORE & BLACK, Aa.urALTY § 1-13 (1954), for an interesting analysis of the principles involved in the problem of dual jurisdiction, including citation of the pertinent cases.
Of particular importance to this question is the so-called saving clause, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the states, of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."
3The Golden Gate, 52 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1931); The Grand Republic, 138 Fed. 615
(E.D.N.Y. 1905), ajJ'd, 144 Fed. 1022 (2d Cir. 1906); Morris v. Bartlett, 108 Fed. 675 (3d Cir.
1901); Rogers v. The Reliance, 20 Fed. Cas. 1125 (No. 12,019) (C.C.D. La. 1872); Baun v.
The Ethel G., 125 F. Supp. 835 (D. Alaska 1954); The Henry S., 4 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Va.
1933); The Eastern Shore, 24 F.2d 443 (D. Md. 1928); Everett v. United States, 277 Fed. 256

